Even proponents of unilateral sanctions would admit that their effect is the second best. The problem is that it is often extremely difficult to get international support for certain sanctions. The prospects of gaining buy-in from others typically reflect a number of factors, including business interests, political preferences, and the availability of funds to compensate for the loss of income. Sanctions generally work best when there is an international political consensus and non-target countries that have to bear an economic price because of sanctions are compensated. In most cases, other governments prefer absence or minimal sanctions. Other countries tend to place more importance on trade interaction than the United States and are less willing to voluntarily abandon it. Moreover, the idea that economic interaction is desirable because it promotes more open political and economic systems is an argument that generally resonates more in other capitals. Such thinking makes it less possible to gain multilateral support for sanctions than the United States tends to want. Normally, something truly outrageous – Saddam`s invasion and occupation of Kuwait, Libya`s support for lockerbie-like terrorism, the brazen rejection of Haiti`s election results and the widespread human rights violations associated with it – is needed to overcome this anti-sanctions bias. And even in the case of Iraq, generous compensation for affected states such as Egypt and Turkey was a prerequisite for continued support for sanctions. Sanctions have long been the subject of controversy, with scientists questioning their impact on citizens, the degree of ethnocentrism in the design and implementation of sanctions, and the possibility of ineffectiveness. I will deal with these two related but distinct issues one by one. Unilateral sanctions always have some impact, both on the United States and on the destination country.
==External links==The sanctions have clearly weakened the Cuban economy, slowed investment in Libya and Iran, and hurt Pakistan, which received significant economic and military support from the United States prior to the sanctions. As this section shows, despite the shift from comprehensive to targeted sanctions, sectoral sanctions are adopted in such a way that they can have a negative humanitarian impact on the civilian population of the target country and on third countries. To the extent that such measures are taken in the name of Community interests such as international peace and security, they also affect the interests of the international community. The following section examines the (limited) application of the principle of proportionality to unilateral sanctions under applicable international law. Diplomatic sanctions are political measures taken to express disapproval or dissatisfaction with a particular act through diplomatic and political means, rather than affecting economic or military relations. Measures include restricting or cancelling high-level government visits or expelling or withdrawing diplomatic missions or personnel. The second category of designs consists of sanctions aimed at containing a threat to the peace within a geographical boundary. [7] The Iranian debate on nuclear proliferation in 2010 is a contemporary example. On June 9, the current United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1929, which imposes restrictions on missiles and weapons materials that can be used in the production of destructive weapons. [9] This principle of restriction is intended to limit the possibility of Iranian aggression in the neighbouring region. Comprehensive sanctions were considered disproportionate in their collateral effects for the damage caused to the population of sanctioned States. With the advent of the concept of targeted sanctions, it was expected that issues of proportionality would fade.
After all, targeted sanctions should be proportionate in nature, precisely because they have been targeted. Nevertheless, the use of selective embargoes, also known as sectoral sanctions, continues to raise questions of proportionality. One of the shortcomings of the current system is that there is no single standard of proportionality that applies to unilateral sanctions, as these measures fall under different types of legal systems, each with its own standard of proportionality. Based on recent State practice and existing legal standards, this paper sets out the respective interests that should be taken into account in discussions on proportionality in different sanctions regimes and examines the extent to which the principle of proportionality can take into account each of these interests. These sanctions are presented as simply targeting corrupt officials, but they have broader implications. They deter further trade relations with target countries and often legitimize stricter U.S. measures. It is not clear whether they are in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. According to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, only the UN Security Council has a mandate from the international community to impose sanctions (Article 41), which must be respected by all UN member states (Article 2.2). They are the most powerful peaceful means of the international community to prevent or eliminate threats to international peace and security.
Sanctions do not include the use of military force. However, where sanctions do not result in the diplomatic settlement of a conflict, the use of force may be approved separately by the Security Council in accordance with article 42. Trying to force others to join a sanctions effort by threatening secondary sanctions against third parties who are unwilling to sanction the target can cause serious harm to various U.S. foreign policy interests. That is what happened in Cuba, Iran and Libya; In all three cases, sanctions now apply to foreign companies that violate the provisions of U.S. law. This threat has had a certain deterrent effect on the willingness of some individuals and companies to engage in prohibited commercial activities, but at a significant political cost. This has exacerbated anti-American sentiment, spurred challenges that have the potential to jeopardize the future of the World Trade Organization, diverted attention from the provocative behavior of target governments, and made Europeans less likely to work with us to develop policies to address the challenges of the post-Cold War era. Although Neffe`s conception of sanctions focuses on its coercive objective – to pressure the state apparatus to change its behavior by manipulating its cost-benefit analysis – even if the sanctioner pursues a different objective, such as. B send a signal or restrict, prevent or punish the goal, it uses the imposition of pain, to achieve it. From a pragmatic perspective, it is unrealistic to expect that sectoral sanctions will not have a negative impact on non-targeted individuals and institutions. To quote his nephew again: « Sanctions are supposed to cause pain and change policy » and this will have humanitarian consequences at « street level ».22 « After all, » he writes, « If you deliberately reduce a country`s ability to earn foreign exchange through exports, then almost by definition, you will exert at least some pressure on imports, including food and medicine.
23 This leads to a number of questions, among them: « How to adapt the sanctions so that they achieve their objective with the minimum of pain necessary in relation to the sanctioned objective? 24 This question refers to the question of proportionality; it shall be formulated in such a way as to require a balance between the sender`s objective and the necessary discomfort imposed on the target, including the negative impact on the civilian population. Penalties may also restrict the activity of economic operators who are not nationals of the State of destination; in particular, this issue is a consequence of so-called extraterritorial sanctions. Most countries and experts in international law believe that sanctions are only legitimate if they are approved by the United Nations Security Council or the World Trade Organization. Economic sanctions outside the framework of the Charter of the United Nations are generally considered « unilateral » and illegal. The general definition of a response is that of a lawful but unfriendly act. Since reciprocal acts are necessarily legal, States have a wide margin of appreciation. According to Giegerich, the principle of proportionality does not impose any legal limit on extortion; any restriction of an ethical or political nature would be.59 Acts of response are sanctions that, for example, would violate a contract between the person subject to the sanction and the sanctioned party, but which fall within the scope of the permitted exceptions. .
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